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Abstract: Critics often argue that Ross’s metaphysical and epistemological accounts of all-
things-considered duties suffer from the problem of explanation. For Ross did not give us any 
clear explanation of the combination of pro tanto duties, i.e. how principles of pro tanto duties 
can combine. Following from this, he did not explain how we could arrive at overall justified 
moral judgements. In this paper, I will argue that the problem of explanation is not compelling. 
First of all, it is based on the classical account of pro tanto duties. Principles of pro tanto duties 
can be understood in another way, i.e. in terms of reason-giving account that might be of help 
to provide a response to the critics. Furthermore, critics fail to see some evidence in Ross about 
how we can arrive at moral judgements.
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W. D. Ross’s contribution idea of prima facie duty has been admired by A. C. Ewing 
as “one of the most important discoveries of the century in moral philosophy” (1959, 126). 
Ross believes that we should distinguish between prima facie duties and actual duties or a 
duty proper. He sometimes calls a duty proper a “toti-resultant attribute” of an action and 
a prima facie duty a “parti-resultant attribute” (1930; 2002, 28). Whether an act is a prima 
facie duty depends on whether it has a morally-relevant non-moral property. However, 
Ross believes that “[w]hether an act is a duty proper or an actual duty depends on all the 
morally significant kinds it is an instance of.” (1930; 2002, 19-20)
Ross does not use the terminology of “prima facie duty” to refer to a duty that seems to 
be a duty at first sight, though it may turn out to be illusory on further reflection. Rather, the 
phrase “prima facie duty” is supposed to refer to a duty that comes from part of the nature 
of the moral situation. This duty that comes from part of the nature of the moral situation 
must be distinguished from overall duty that arises from the whole nature of the situation.
To illustrate this, suppose I promise my wife that I will go out with her tonight; 
however, my mother is sick, and I should stay with her. I have then two prima facie duties 
of fidelity and beneficence. To find out which duty is my actual duty, we have to use 
our judgement or perception in an “all things considered” way. We should consider the 
whole nature of the situation to reach our verdict. Of course, we may make a mistake in 
identifying something as a prima facie duty, but we may also make the same mistake in 
identifying something as an actual duty. Some of what we take to be actual duties may 
turn out to be illusory as well.
Moreover, it is not true that the contrast between prima facie and actual duties 
is a contrast between an apparent and a real duty. Prima facie duties are real moral 
considerations, not ones that seem to be duties at first sight. This leads us to think that a 
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prima facie duty, in fact, is not a type of duty. But it is related to duty in a particular way. Ross 
explicitly writes in this regard that:
[The prima facie duties] suggest that what we are speaking of is a certain kind of duty, 
whereas it is in fact not a duty, but something related in a special way to duty. (1930; 
2002, 20)
So, Ross’s distinction between prima facie and actual duties is not the distinction 
between apparent and real duties. I think the terminology “pro tanto duties” for prima facie 
duties and “all-things-considered duties” for actual duties is less misleading. Hooker, for 
instance, writes:
[T]he term “pro tanto” is less misleading than “prima facie”. For the idea is that a duty 
or consideration is overridable, not that it can be seen at first glance but on closer 
inspection may prove to be an illusion. (1996, 534, fn. 6)
The idea behind pro tanto duties is that certain properties or features of situations 
count morally in favour or against action. Of these properties, some are more important 
in some case, but others are more important in other cases. For example, suppose that 
A borrows a gun from his friend B promising to give it back as soon as B asks. After one 
week, B asks for his gun. But A knows that B wants his gun to kill someone. On the one 
hand, A should keep his promise and return the gun to B. On the other hand, A has a pro 
tanto duty of non-maleficence. So relevant here are A’s two pro tanto duties of fidelity and 
non- maleficence. We come to believe on reflection that of course A’s all-things-considered 
duty is not to keep the promise.
I. THE PROBLEM OF E X PL A NATION
We can distinguish at least three claims in the Rossian ethical framework, i.e. two 
metaphysical claims and one epistemological one (Stratton-Lake 2002, x-xii; Audi 2004, 
21). According to the:
1. first metaphysical claim: There are several (five) pro tanto duties or principles which 
are general. These principles determine the moral status of actions and contribute to the 
moral evaluation of concrete ethical situations. 
And according to the:
2. second metaphysical claim: There is no hierarchy for these pro tanto duties, i.e. it is 
not the case that some pro tanto duties automatically outweigh any other in cases where 
they conflict. Pro tanto duties combine together and contribute to the deontic evaluation 
of different cases in such a way that we cannot know what would constitute the ultimate 
outcome (all-things-considered duty) in advance or even afterwards. 
The second claim is controversial and must be explained. The issue is whether there 
is some way of thinking of pro tanto duties as a flexible hierarchy. For example, Dancy, 
as a commentator, believes that there is no structure to Ross’s five basic pro tanto duties. 
Dancy thinks no sense can be given to the claim that promises are more important than, 
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say, good production. So, in his view, it is not true that one duty is more important than 
another. This leads Dancy to hold that there is no hierarchical order between pro tanto 
duties. Instead, we have a formless list of duties. Dancy writes:
There is no general ranking of the different types of prima facie duty. [...] There is just a 
shapeless list of them [...]. (1991, 221)
However, Dancy’s interpretation might be wrong. In The Right and the Good, Ross 
lists five duties. He thought that these five basic duties or principles are the minimal 
number of such duties or principles (Ross 1930; 2002, 21, 27). Ross says that some pro 
tanto duties are more stringent than others, and in fact he offers a flexible hierarchy for 
them. He states that the duties of non-maleficence, fidelity and reparation are weightier 
than beneficence (Ross 1930; 2002, 22, 30). Elsewhere, in the Foundations of Ethics, he 
says that the pro tanto duty to keep a promise can be cancelled under certain conditions, 
and in those circumstances the fact that one has made a promise carries no deontic weight 
(Ross 1939, 188). Yet, the duties of non-maleficence, fidelity and reparation do not always 
outweigh beneficence. All Ross can say is that reparation, for instance, can be overridden 
only by a significant amount of well-being for others. However, an account of “significant” 
can vary from case to case (Stratton-Lake 2002, xxxvi-xxxvii).
Thus, the bottom line is that, on the basis of Ross’s position, we cannot produce a 
higher-order principle to establish which pro tanto duties are more important than others. 
In fact, “the importance” or weight of each duty turns out differently in different contexts. 
So, we can restate the second claim this way. According to the:
2a. second metaphysical claim-revised: There are no rigid hierarchies (such as a lexical 
ordering) between pro tanto duties according to which one is always more important.1 
Although there is no such thing as a rigid hierarchy for pro tanto duties, there might be a 
flexible hierarchy for them.
One can think of a sort of flexible hierarchy for pro tanto duties as in many cases; for 
example, we can imagine that non-maleficence, fidelity and reparation generally outweigh 
beneficence. But it is not the case that we have a rigid hierarchy in that for example fidelity 
always outweighs beneficence. What is supposed to be the difference between the original 
version of the second metaphysical claim and the revised version is that although neither 
version accepts a rigid hierarchy, the second metaphysical claim states that there is no 
hierarchy for pro tanto duties but the revised version states that there might be a flexible 
hierarchy for them.
Finally, according to the
3. epistemological claim: The basic principles of pro tanto duties are self-evident in the 
sense that they can be known directly though sometimes they need reflection.2 We often are 
1] Audi (2004, 28) prefers to read Ross based on the second metaphysical claim; however, Stratton-
Lake (2002, xxxvi-xxxvii) prefers to read Ross according to the revised version of second metaphysical claim.
2] Although Ross took all the pro tanto duties to be self-evident, one can ask why we should assume 
that they all are. However, since every system of morality takes some propositions to be self-evident, for the 
The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Account of pro tanto Duties in the Rossian Ethical Framework 72
justified in believing these moral principles non-inferentially.3 In order to arrive at a moral 
judgement about our all-things-considered duty in a concrete moral situation, we have to 
use our rational judgement; however, these judgements are not self-evident.4
Taking some principles as self-evident does not entail that they are obvious and that 
there is no debate about them (Ross 1939, 188). We conclude what the ultimate outcome 
of the combination of principles of pro tanto duty is by looking at the case and reflecting 
on it in more detail in order to arrive at a moral judgement. Note that this is not a matter 
of non-inferential knowledge. The reason is that there is no such thing as a higher set of 
moral rules that can guide us to arrive at moral judgements (Ross 1930; 2002, 29).5
However, based on these claims, critics such as John Searle (1987, 81-90) object that 
Ross’s metaphysical and epistemological accounts of all-things-considered duties, and the 
way in which different pro tanto duties are combined together and contribute to the moral 
evaluation and judgement in moral conflict cases, are vague and unclear. Let us call this:
The Problem of Explanation: Ross did not give us clear explanation of the combination 
of pro tanto duties, i.e. how principles of pro tanto duties can combine. Following from 
this, he did not explain how we could arrive at overall justified moral judgements.
This, however, needs to be qualified. As I have shown above, in the Rossian 
framework we cannot determine in the abstract what would be the ultimate outcome of a 
case in which, for example, fidelity is combined with another pro tanto duty, say gratitude, 
because the ultimate outcome strongly depends on the details of the case. Yet, as there is 
no rigid hierarchy for these principles of pro tanto duty, we have to judge how they combine 
together and contribute to the moral evaluation of the case. In order to do that, we pick out 
the outcome of the combination of several principles of pro tanto duty when we look at the 
case carefully and through further reflection on more details. So, according to Ross, in 
order to arrive at an all-things-considered judgement in a concrete ethical situation, one 
has to consider all the principles of pro tanto duties and think about the whole case and its 
characteristics insofar as one can. Let me elaborate this with an example of:
The Manager Case: Suppose that a manager of a company arranges an appointment 
that is crucial for the company, financially speaking. However, just half an hour 
before the appointment, he learns that his mother has been hospitalised following 
a car accident.
What is his all-things-considered duty? Would he be justified in cancelling his 
appointment to go and see his mother in hospital or should he fulfil his promise, leave his 
mother on her own and ask somebody else to see her? According to Ross, the manager 
sake of argument, I assume that Ross is right and will not argue about this.
3] I say “often” because Ross holds in one of his papers that we can arrive at intuitive judgements even 
inferentially. See Ross (1927, at 121).
4] Ross thinks that there are no principles for all-things-considered duties. 
5] Elsewhere, I explained what non-inferentiality entails in moral intuitionist framework, see 
Dabbagh (2017 & 2018).
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has two different pro tanto duties, fidelity and gratitude (or beneficence), which come into 
conflict in this case. On the one hand, fidelity, which rests on the previous action of the 
manager, requires him to fulfil his promise. On the other hand, gratitude, which rests on 
the previous actions of his mother, requires him to stay with her in such an important 
situation. If the manager asks Ross how he can arrive at a justified moral judgement in this 
situation, what would Ross say? 
The manager has to use his judgement to determine the outcome of this conflict 
of pro tanto duties. He must look at the case and reflect on it in more detail and consider 
everything that is morally relevant. So, one can understand how different pro tanto duties 
are combined and how we can arrive at a tenable moral judgement by looking at the case 
and reflecting on it in more detail. In fact, there is no other thing here to which we can 
appeal. Just exercise more reflection on the case, use your judgement and decide.
Critics, however, are not persuaded by the above Rossian story, because they are 
confused how “reflection” or “looking” is an explanation of anything. Consider again the 
manager case provided above. Later on, if the manager says that he still cannot see the 
point, what should he do to grasp the weightier principles of pro tanto duties? According to 
above story, the manager has to look at the case again, look again, and use his judgement. 
That is all. He cannot say anything else. So, the manager has to look at the case over time 
to arrive at a justified moral judgement. Nevertheless, the manager can say, “I am still 
perplexed, and I do not know straight off what to do”. 
Critics believe that the manager is not, in effect, offered an account that tells him 
which is the most important of the conflicting pro tanto duties. Although the Rossian 
metaphysical account of the combination of principles of pro tanto duties in moral conflict 
cases and their contribution to the moral evaluation of different cases is understandable, 
the epistemological Rossian account is obscure. Thus, it seems that the Rossian account of 
how we could arrive at justified moral judgements in moral conflict cases has to be revised.
The problem of explanation is not, I think, compelling. First of all, it is based on the 
classical account of pro tanto duties, i.e. the first metaphysical claim (Dancy 1981). Principles 
of pro tanto duties can be understood in another way, i.e. in terms of reason that might be of 
help to provide a response to the critics (Scanlon 1998, 1-13; Stratton-Lake 2013; 2011b, 
178; Audi 2004, 23-24). Furthermore, critics fail to see some evidence in Ross about how 
we can arrive at moral judgements. Let me explain. 
II. R E A SON-GI V ING ACCOU NT OF PRO-TA NTO DUTIES
In his Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, Ewing talks about pro tanto duties and 
all-things-considered duties with reference to reason. He distinguishes between good and 
conclusive reason for action (Ewing 1959, 63, 110). Having a pro tanto duty to do an action 
provides a good reason to do (or not to do) it. To have an all-things-considered duty for 
doing an action provides a conclusive reason for doing or not doing that. Of course, it is 
not the case that wherever there is a good reason to do X there is also a pro tanto duty to do 
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X. That is, it is not the case that if one has good reasons to do things, then one has real duty 
of any kind to do them. For instance, I have a good reason to take a painkiller right now, 
but no duty to do so. Although one can think that duties (or obligations) provide reasons, 
it is not plausible to say that reasons provide duties (or obligations), and hence we cannot 
accept that there are duties iff there are reasons. As another example, imagine that I have 
been very generous to Oxfam. I nevertheless have a reason to send even more money to 
that charity, the reason being that even more will do even more good. However, if I have 
already made very big contributions at a large cost to my own good, I have no duty to make 
further contributions.6 
Following Ewing, Urmson and Stratton-Lake, I believe that understanding pro tanto 
duties in terms of reasons, i.e. as providing moral reasons to do acts, is more persuasive 
than the classic understanding (Urmson 1975, 112-13; Stratton-Lake 2011b, 147-150).7 
Principles of pro tanto duties specify facts that provide moral reasons for certain actions 
and explain why certain acts ought or ought not to be done. This is a kind of reply that 
Ross can give with regard to how pro tanto duties are combined.
However, one might object that it is not helpful to convert talk of pro tanto duties into 
talk of reasons. This conversion makes us pay a theoretical cost. All pro tanto duties are 
universal, although can be outweighed. They are defined in terms of their force and have 
an element of insistence in them (Owens 2012a and 2012b). But reasons purely as such do 
not have such an element. As a response, to be sure, some reasons explain and justify but 
do not insist, and others do insist.8 The morally important reasons are mainly the ones 
that insist. For the sake of argument, by “moral reasons” here I mean the insisting ones. 
Talking about insistence, again, lends some credence to the point I made above about 
duties providing reason, and not vice versa.
Principles of pro tanto duties specify moral reason-giving facts. These principles 
state which facts provide reasons. I am not claiming that duties themselves are facts which 
provide reason. The duty might be “to meet you at 1:30”. The fact that provides the reason 
is “that I promised to meet you at 1:30”. Hence, the pro tanto duty of fidelity entails that the 
fact that I have promised to Φ gives me a moral reason to Φ.
This understanding of pro tanto duties in terms of reasons allows us to think of the 
conflict of pro tanto duties as a conflict of moral reasons. Therefore, to put my understanding 
of principles of pro tanto duties in a general form: if F is the feature that is pro tanto right and 
contributes in making Φ your all-things-considered duty, then:
6] See the papers by Darwall, Wallace and Little in the festschrift for Dancy, edited by Hooker, 
Bakhurst and Little (2013).
7] Audi (2004, 104) also believes that Ross’s basic pro tanto duties are not only self-evident, but also 
provide independent moral reasons.
8] Talk of reasons can be classified into two categories as “insistent” (obligatory) and “good ground” 
reason. Likewise, Dancy (2004), for example, talks about a distinction between two categories, i.e. “entic-
ing” and “peremptory” reasons, that capture different normative relations.
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“If F explains why you ought to Φ, then F gives you a reason to Φ” (Stratton-Lake 
2011a, 369).
Thus, fidelity, for instance, is a right-making feature. In other words, there are facts 
that provide reasons arising from fidelity; fidelity has an invariant deontic valence; and 
it contributes to the moral evaluation of different cases in the same way (Stratton-Lake 
2002, xliii). But has the explanation problem been solved? 
It is true that Ross said that looking at a moral case and reflecting on it gives us 
an account according to which we can arrive at a tenable judgement. This is how Ross 
expresses the point:
When I am in a situation [...] in which more than one of these prima facie duties is 
incumbent on me, what I have to do is to study the situation as fully as I can until I 
form the considered opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one of them 
is more incumbent than any other; then I am bound to think that to do this prima facie 
duty is my duty sans phrase in the situation. (1930, 2002, 19)
However, this is not the whole story. In some complicated cases, Ross would suggest 
that where relevant, we should aim to get further information, which might (for example) 
involve asking people what they are up to. He said that reflecting upon other cases might 
help us. Consider the following quotes from Ross:
The general principles of duty are obviously not self-evident from the beginning of 
our lives. How do they come to be so? […] we see the prima facie rightness of an act 
which would be the fulfilment of a particular promise, and of another which would 
be the fulfilment of another promise, and when we have reached sufficient maturity 
to think in general terms, we apprehend prima facie rightness to belong to the nature 
of any fulfilment of promise. What comes first in time is the apprehension of the self-
evident prima facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type. From this we 
come by reflection to apprehend the self-evident general principle of prima facie duty. 
(1930; 2002, 32-33)
In my view, we can develop the Rossian account by using the notion of “seeing other 
similarities” and seeing things as similar. Although Ross did not use these terminologies, 
I believe they already have a place in the Rossian framework. So, we can say that in the 
Rossian framework, looking away at other similar cases is an indispensable ingredient to 
understanding. Sometimes, just looking at one case and reflecting on it might not help us to 
reach a justified moral judgement. I believe looking away is important because one of the 
most significant and familiar forms of moral thinking involves thinking about cases like 
the one at hand but with the crucial difference that the roles are reversed − e.g. we have 
to think of ourselves as being on the receiving end of what we are considering doing to 
someone else. Let me explain my view with the following example.
The Robbery Case: Consider the case of a man chatting to his friend that one day when 
he was in rush to his meeting, he saw two boys hitting an old woman to steal her 
money. Having seen this scene, he decided to stop them but he also wanted to be 
punctual at his job. When he tells the story, his friend responds that the man should 
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have helped the women even if he was in rush. The man tells his friend that he was 
trying to keep his promise to be on time. His friend however gives the man some 
more details by citing examples that what he would do if he sees his mother or sister 
getting robbed. His friend also says some more examples to illustrate that helping 
people in danger is more important than punctuality. 
In fact, the man’s friend tries to convince him that he would not do the same in the 
case of his mother’s robbery. His friend also tries to convince him by referring to other 
similar cases that helping people in danger is more important than being on time. His 
friend does not appeal to common properties and intrinsic features of stealing to improve 
his argument. So, instead of just looking at this case, the man has to look away at similar 
and dissimilar cases and ask other people to arrive at the judgement.9 
According to Ross, different pro tanto duties are combined together and contribute 
to the moral evaluation of cases in different ways. But, on the basis of the element that I 
highlighted in the Rossian framework, we can give an account to resolve the problem of 
explanation: looking away at similar combinations of pro tanto duties in different cases and 
getting opinions from other people can help.
We now have an account of how we behave reasonably in different ethical contexts 
that is grounded in the way in which we are engaged in looking away at similar cases. In 
doing so, our behaviour in different contexts makes sense. One can understand how 
different principles of pro tanto duties are combined and how we can arrive at tenable 
moral judgements by looking at other similar cases, by asking other people and by reflecting 
on the different comparable reasons in more detail.
In the robbery case, the more the man looks away at similar cases, the more he can see 
whether he should have helped the woman. Similarly, in the manager case, he will arrive 
at the justified moral judgement to the extent that he is engaged in seeing similar cases. 
There is no theoretical account available that can be used to crank out the justified moral 
judgement. Rather, he has to look away at similar cases to see what has to be done in the 
case. For example, if the manager sees other similar cases, it is very likely that he comes to 
the conclusion that he should abandon his promise under the new condition.
However, there is one possible objection here. One might ask: does not “looking 
away”, “reflecting on other cases” or “getting opinions from others” just generate a regress? 
If our object is the judgements of others or merely other similar factual situations, the same 
problem arises. As a response, although there are some complex situations, ones where our 
reaching a final judgement is difficult and we might need to ask others’ opinions, Rossians 
would believe that this does not necessarily create a regress. Almost all pluralists and at 
least some monists (e.g. Kantian Contractualists and Rule-Utilitarians) might do the 
9] Although “looking away” might not be the best terminology, it does not make it sound as though 
one is ignoring the facts rather than thinking about them. This terminology came to my mind in the discus-
sion with Soroush Dabbagh. For more details, see Dabbagh (2006, Dissertation). Using Hare’s terminol-
ogy, one can also say that in going from prima facie duties to actual duties, we use our capacity of apprehen-
dation, but also a “social consensus” (2000, 88), and this is similar to my solution of looking away.
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same in reaching the final judgement. So, this is not a special problem – if it is at all – for 
intuitionists. They all need to think about the difficult case and consult with other people. 
In the cases where the judgements of others or similar situations are at stake, the only 
plausible answer which Rossians can advise is to practise more and more. All we have, in 
these cases, is to practise reflection, comparing cases and getting opinions from others. 
But looking away at some other cases (such as cases in which you are in my shoes and I 
in yours) and getting other people’s opinions might be enough to stop an infinite regress 
as they give us plausible reasons to reach judgement. Although there is no such thing as a 
valid principle for resolving all regresses in different moral cases, it does not follow from 
this that nothing can be said to explain how to deal with such regresses.
III. PR ACTICE BR INGS YOU M A STERY
Having seen that the problem of the explanation of how different principles of pro 
tanto duty are combined can be removed, the same approach can be assumed with regard 
to the way in which we become competent with the principles of pro tanto duties. We can 
see that promise-keeping is right with practice and through seeing the similarities and 
dissimilarities, e.g. through seeing that that is a promise, that this is a promise, that that is 
not a promise, and so on.10 The more we are engaged in seeing moral cases, the more we see 
what the principles of pro tanto duties are. For instance, if we are wondering whether or not 
the new situation with which we are dealing can be regarded as an example of gratitude, 
we have to look away at other cases of gratitude and compare the case at hand with them.
According to Ross, we arrive at moral principles about pro tanto duties by seeing what 
features of actions count either morally for or morally against actions in different instances. 
Perhaps, when Ross is talking about sufficient mental maturity and its vital role in grasping a 
pro tanto duty, he has something similar in mind. Consider the following quotes:
[…] when I reflect on my own attitude towards particular acts, I seem to find that it 
is not by deduction but by direct insight that I see them to be right, or wrong. I never 
seem to be in the position of not seeing directly the rightness of a particular act of 
kindness, for instance […]. (1939, 171)
Seeing a number of examples, for Ross, helps us to see the rightness or wrongness of 
promise-keeping (or seeing the fact which states the reasonableness of promise-keeping). 
One could arrive at the general principle that promise-keeping is a pro tanto duty by seeing 
different cases. The more we see different promise-keeping cases, the more we see what 
promise-keeping is. In effect, we come to know, in Ross’s ideas, the rightness or wrongness 
of moral duties or principles by knowing particular instances. For instance, we come 
to know that promise-breaking is pro tanto wrong by becoming acquainted with some 
particular cases of promise-breaking. (Ross 1930, 2002, 32-33)11
10] For more on practice theories, see Thompson (2008). For an alternative view, see Owens (2011).
11] See Hooker (2002) for an alternative view.
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The whole point is that the procedure of grasping a moral principle is open-ended. It 
does not follow from this that there is no such thing as principle. What does follow is that 
the more we are engaged in seeing different cases, the more we see what the principle is. 
In other words, the more we are engaged in seeing different reasons, the more we acquire 
mastery of how the reasons can contribute in different moral cases.12
I V. CONCLUSIONS
The Rossian ethical framework, critics have argued, has a problem concerning 
explanation. According to the problem, the way in which different principles of pro tanto 
duties are combined together and make all-things-considered duties, both metaphysically 
and epistemologically, is vague and unclear. In order to tackle the problem, I introduced 
the reason-giving account of pro tanto duties and suggested that by bringing in the notion 
of “looking away” and “seeing other similarities”, which already exist in the Rossian 
framework, we can give an account of how we arrive at a justified moral judgement in 
a concrete situation. The Rossian notion of principles of pro tanto duties can be better 
understood in the light of such illumination.
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank Philip Stratton-Lake and Brad Hooker, and the editor and 
anonymous reviewers, for their critical comments.
hdabbagh@dohainstitute.edu.qa
R EFER ENCES
Audi, Robert. 2004. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton 
University Press.
Dabbagh, Soroush. 2006. Moral Reasons: Particularism, Patterns and Practice. Warwick University 
Dissertation.
Dabbagh, Hossein. 2017. Sinnott‐Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological Intuitionism. 
Philosophical Forum 48 (2):175-99.
———. 2018. Intuiting Intuition: The Seeming Account of Moral Intuition. Croatian Journal 
of Philosophy 18 (1):117-32.
Dancy, Jonathan. 1981. On Moral Properties. Mind, 90: 367-83. 
———. 2004. Enticing Reasons. In J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S. Schefﬂer, M. Smith (eds.), Reason and 
Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1991. An Ethics of Prima Facie Duties. In P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. 
Oxford: Blackwell: 219-29.
Ewing, A. C. 1959. Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
12] Scanlon and Stratton-Lake believe that we can define moral concepts such as good and bad in terms 
of reasons. In the same way, I think, the more we are engaged in seeing different cases, the more we find reasons. 
In effect, reasoning is a kind of practice. See Scanlon (1998, 96 & 96ff) and Stratton-lake (2002, xx and 2004).
79
Hare, R. M. 2000. Sorting Out Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Hooker, Brad. 2002. Intuitions and Moral Theorizing. In P. Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical 
Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 161-83.
Hooker, Brad. 1996. Ross-Style Pluralism vs. Rule-Consequentialism. Mind, 105: 531-52.
Hooker, Brad., Bakhurst, David., Little, Margaret. 2013. Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the 
Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press.
Owens, David. 2012a. The Value of Duty. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary, Vol. 
86 (1): 199-215.
———. 2012b. Promises. The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. H. LaFollette (ed.). Blackwell, 
pp. 4143-4155.
———. 2011. The Problem with Promising. In Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Understanding 
Promises: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 58-79.
Ross, W. D. 1927. The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics. International Journal of Ethics, 37: 
113-27.
———. 1939. The Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1930 [2002]. The Right and the Good. P. Stratton-Lake, (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Scanlon, Tim. 1998. What We Owe To Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Searle, John. 1987. Prima facie Obligations. In J. Raz (ed.), Practical Reasoning. Oxford University 
Press: 81-90.
Stratton, Philip. 2004. Introduction. In P. Stratton-Lake (ed.), On What We Owe to Each Other. 
Blackwell, Oxford: 1-17.
———. 2011a. Recalcitrant pluralism. Ratio, 24 (4): 364-83.
———. 2011b. Eliminativism about derivative prima facie duties. In T. Hurka (ed.), 
Underivative Duty. Oxford University Press: 146-65.
———. 2013. Ross, W. D. In H. LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. 
Wiley-Blackwell.
———. 2002. Introduction. In P. Stratton-Lake (ed.), W. D. Ross’s The Right and the Good. 
Oxford University Press: ix-xlix. 
Thompson, Michael. 2008. Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought. 
Harvard University Press. 
Urmson, J. O. 1975. A Defence of Intuitionism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 75: 111-19.

